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Encore Issues | PW | PC(USA) |
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The Water War by Mariela Ribera To understand Bolivia’s experience with the privatization of water, it is important to understand that Bolivia is the environmental heart of South America; it possesses important ecosystems and natural bioregulators. The 74,743 meters of water in Bolivia make it 16th among 180 countries for having abundant hydrologic resources.1 In the interior of the country there are three great hydrographic basins—the La Plata river basin (to the south), the Amazonian river basin (to the north) and the lake basins (in the highlands of central Bolivia). A hydrographic basin is a geographic area drained by a stream, river, lake or system of bodies of water. Despite this divine blessing of fresh water, access to it in some areas is neither easy nor equitable. In addition, contamination and poor distribution of water are serious problems. People lack information on the basics of water supply, making the monitoring of precipitation and hydrographic basin drainage very difficult.2 Social Problems Cochabamba is an excellent reference case in point for a discussion of distribution problems, poor water quality and, above all, the commercial solutions to water problems. This city started experiencing serious water shortages in the 1980s when people living in nearby rural areas migrated to the city. Cochabamba saw rapid population growth—10 percent per year. Toward the end of the ’90s the situation turned unbearable. Nearly 70 percent of the population received water for just a few hours each day, yet had to pay high charges for access to the municipal potable water system. Many residents from impoverished sectors bought water from tankers at elevated prices, despite the fact that this water often was contaminated.3 Initially, city officials suggested that the problem could be alleviated by getting water from sources near Cochabamba, such as rural farming communities. Despite their location in one of the most fertile valleys of South America, the farmers resisted the proposal. The situation became very tense. This is how the proposal for the megaproject, Misicuni, was born. Misicuni called for the construction of a dam on the northern side of the Tunari mountain range and the excavation of a tunnel more than 12 miles long that would deliver water from the Misicuni reservoir to Cochabamba. A spectacular campaign was conducted to convince the population that the Misicuni Project was the solution to the shortage of water in the Cochabamba Valley, but nothing was said about its elevated budget. In reality, neither the Bolivian government nor the city of Cochabamba had the resources to underwrite the Misicuni Project.4 In mid-1999, rather than bidding out the project, the Bolivian government invited Aguas del Tunari (a consortium composed of six partners: International Water Ltd. of London, a subsidiary of Bechtel Enterprises Inc. of San Francisco, California, and Edison S.P.A. of Milan, Italy, with a 55 percent share; Abengoa of Spain with 25 percent; and four Bolivian partners each with 5 percent) to take over the municipal drinking water and sewage system. The government accepted the company’s conditions, which emphasized commercial interests and profit while reducing the original objectives laid out under the Misicuni Project. From the time Aguas del Tunari took control of the water, water bills were more than 50 percent higher. It was thus demonstrated that water management is power and money in hand. This scarce and valuable resource should not be turned over to governments or private entities that fail to guarantee a fair distribution. Justice and Water The highly inflated costs led to a serious confrontation between Bechtel Enterprises and the citizens of Cochabamba and Bolivia. The city and the country, which had earlier been divided, now came together to fight against a monster that represented a common threat—the privatization of water. In April 2002, the Aguas del Tunari consortium pulled out of the country in response to a week-long social uprising that included civic strikes, blocking of roads, confrontations with the police and the death of a civilian. This uprising came to be known as the Water War. Women were among the most important participants in the Water War. Among the motivations to mobilize and protest were women’s membership in communities and peasant organizations, and how much women and their families were directly affected by the contract.5 Bechtel filed a lawsuit against Bolivia and went before the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, alleging investment losses, although it had only invested $1.5 million in the project, the lawsuit asked for $25 million. This incident demonstrates the tremendous power of transnational corporations over the countries where they operate.6 Bechtel is one of the largest United States-based transnational companies. It is one of the ten most powerful businesses in this country. It has implemented close to 19,000 engineering and construction projects in 140 countries and is currently in charge of the reconstruction in Iraq after the invasion of that country. In 2001, Bechtel reported an income of $14.3 billion, ten times the public expenditures in Bolivia for the same year.7 Cochabamba continues to suffer from lack of water. The Misicuni Project was never completed and people continue to buy water from tankers. Developing models for equitable distribution and water quality control is an indispensable matter, because water is no longer simply a collective good for humanity; water now runs the risk of becoming the blue gold of commerce.
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